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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PREHIRE
AGREEMENTS: CONTRACTORS,
LABORERS, TEAMSTERS & ENGINEERS
HEALTH & WELFARE PLAN v.
ASSOCIATED WRECKING CO.
To protect the right of employees to select the bargaining rep-
resentative of their choice,1 Congress has made it an unfair labor
practice for an employer or labor organization to sign a representa-
tion agreement if the union has not yet attained majority support.
Pursuant to section 8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act),3 however, the execution of an agreement with a minority
I See Hearings on S. 2926 Before Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 73d Cong.,
2d Seass. 27, 436-39 (1934), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 464-73 (1949). See generally 1 J. JENKINS, LABOR LAW § 2.2,
at 55 (1968); Keyseling, The Wagner Act: Its Origins and Current Significance, 29 Gao.
WASH. L. REV. 199, 216-19, 232-33 (1961). Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
(the Act) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to re-
frain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that [permissible union
security clauses provide otherwise].
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
2 See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737
(1961); NLRB v. Trosch, 321 F.2d 692, 695-97 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993
(1964). Employers are prohibited from interfering with, or restraining employees' rights
under section 7 of the Act, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1976); note 1 supra, and may not
contribute support to or dominate a labor organization, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976). A
grant of exclusive recognition by an employer to a minority union constitutes an impermissi-
ble interference with employees' section 7 rights. See 366 U.S. at 737-38. An employer who
recognizes such a union, therefore, ordinarily is guilty of an unfair labor practice. E.g.,
NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 588, 587 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 1978); Komatz Constr., Inc. v.
NLRB, 458 F.2d 317, 322 (8th Cir. 1972). In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act to
proscribe union unfair practices. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch.
120, § 8, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). This statute imposed upon unions those restrictions against
violating employee rights which had been applicable to employers. 366 U.S. at 738; see S.
REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1947). Thus, Congress has provided for freedom of
choice in the selection of bargaining representatives by ensuring that an unconsenting ma-
jority will not be represented by an agent selected by the minority. 366 U.S. at 737; see
NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 344 (1978).
3 See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, §
705, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976)). Section 8(f) provides
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union is permissible when the employer is "engaged primarily in
the building and construction industry."4 Although section 8(f) le-
gitimizes such "prehire" agreements,5 it preserves the employees'
in pertinent part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice.., for an employer engaged primarily
in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employ-
ees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and
construction industry with a labor organization of which building and construction
employees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action
defined in subsection (a) of this section as an unfair labor practice) because (1)
the majority status of such labor organization has not been established under the
provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of such agreement ....
Provided... [t]hat any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of
this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) or
159(e) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). Because Congress did not indicate how to determine
whether an employer is "engaged primarily" in the construction industry, see id., it had
been unclear which employers could execute prehire agreements. See, e.g., Witney, LMRDA
Title VII: Its Problems and Their Development, in SYmposiUM ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLosURE ACT OF 1959, at 630, 647-48 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961). Moreover,
the statute merely states that such contracts can be executed "with a labor organization of
which building and construction employees are members .... " See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f)
(1976). Thus, commentators have been unsure whether a union was required to attain a
certain percentage of construction workers as members before being able to benefit from
section 8(f). See, e.g., Witney, supra, at 647-48.
The NLRB has addressed the question concerning employer eligibility in a number of
decisions. In Forest City/DiUlon-Tecon Pacific, 209 N.L.R.B. 867 (1974), modified on other
grounds per curiam, 522 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1975), for example, the Board, looking to Con-
gress' purpose in enacting section 8(f), concluded that "[t]here is no question that the inten-
tion of the legislature" was to exclude employers who used a continuous and regular comple-
ment of employees. 209 N.L.R.B. at 869-71. Section 8(f) clearly is not applicable to
manufacturing employees even if their functions bear a substantial, intimate relation to the
construction industry. 209 N.L.R.B. at 871; Frick Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1204, 1208 (1963); see,
e.g., Hoover, Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 593, 599 (1979) (operator of sand, stone and gravel compa-
nies not within ambit of section 8(f) even though its products were used in construction
industry).
Although apparently it has clarified the meaning of the term "employer," the NLRB
has yet to describe the requirements a union must meet to fall within the operation of sec-
tion 8(f). It appears that if the employee sought to be represented is a construction worker,
the union may become a party to a prehire agreement. See IBEC Housing Corp., 245
N.L.R.B. 1282, 1282-83 (1979). Whether an individual is a "construction employee," how-
ever, is a much litigated question. See, e.g., Construction, Building Materials & Misc. Driv-
ers, Local 83, 243 N.L.R.B. 328, 330-31 (1979); Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 752, 754-
55 (1973), enforced, 87 L.R.R.M. 3276 (7th Cir. 1974); Lion Country Safari, Inc., 194
N.L.R.B. 1227, 1231 (1972).
5 A prehire agreement is an arrangement through which a union and an employer may
agree to have a union shop prior to a showing of majority support for the union. R. GORMAN,
LABOR LAW 647-48 (1976); see Administrative Rulings of NLRB General Counsel, Case No.
SR-813, 46 L.R.R.M. 1515, 1515 (1960) (prehire agreement may be executed with minority
union). A union may not picket or otherwise coerce an employer to execute a prehire con-
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freedom to select a bargaining representative by expressly provid-
ing that these agreements shall not bar representation elections.'
tract, Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 142 N.L.R.B. 1132, 1135 (1963), enforced,
331 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 889 (1964), because the NLRB and the
courts have construed section 8(f) as authorizing only voluntary agreements, NLRB v. Local
Union 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 348-49 & n.10 (1978); 142 N.L.R.B.
at 1135. This interpretation appears to comport with the section's legislative history. See 11
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIscLosuRE ACT
OF 1959, at 1577-78 [hereinafter cited as II LEGIS. HIsT.]; H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 19-20, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2424, 2442; CONFERENCE RE-
PORT ON H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., lt Sess. 41-42 (1959). Then Senator John F.
Kennedy, referring to the archetype of the present section, stated:
It was not the intention of the Committee to require ... the making of
prehire agreements, but, rather, to permit them; nor was it the intention of the
Committee to authorize a labor organization to strike, picket, or otherwise coerce
an employer to sign a prehire agreement .... The purpose of this section is to
permit voluntary prehire agreements.
104 CONG. REC. 1130 (1958) (Remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
Section 8(f) provides that prehire agreements may contain union security clauses, re-
quiring that, as a condition of employment, prospective employees join the union after the
seventh day of work. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). In the usual collective bargaining agree-
ment, union security clauses cannot require union membership until after the thirtieth day
of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). The 7-day provision of section 8(f), therefore,
appears to be a concession to the transitory nature of construction work. See notes 60-66
and accompanying text infra. Because prehire agreements are subject to section 14(b) of the
Act, however, S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2318, 2345, union security clauses may not be executed if a violation of state
law would result. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1976); see R. GORMAN, supra, at 663-64.
The availability of union security clauses in prehire agreements is problematical since
the NLRB has indicated that an enforced security provision may give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that a union has attained majority status. R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B.
693, 695 n.5 (1971) (dicta), enforcement denied, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This ap-
pears to conflict with the general rule that a union is not presumed to represent a majority
under a prehire agreement. See, e.g., Davenport Insulation, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. 908, 912
(1970); cf. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 736
(1961) (agreement with minority union gives the organization "a deceptive cloak of author-
ity with which to persuasively elicit additional employee support"). For a discussion of addi-
tional terms permitted to be included in prehire agreements, see Witney, supra note 4, at
646-49.
6 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976) (prehire agreementa do not bar petitions for representa-
tion elections provided for in 29 U.S.C. § 159(c), (e) (1976)). The original bill provided that
the NLRB could certify a labor organization as the exclusive representative of construction
employees whenever a petition was filed stating that a prehire agreement had been exe-
cuted. II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 5, at 1578. The Act provides that certification constitutes
a bar to representation elections for a 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976). See
also General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123, 1124-28 (1962). The bill was criticized, there-
fore, as an unreasonable restraint on employees' rights to select a bargaining representative.
See II LEGIs. HIST., supra note 5, at 1578. Accordingly, to preserve "freedom of choice in
situations where [representation] elections could be held," the bill was amended to include a
proviso stating that a prehire agreement would not bar a petition for an election. Id. at
1750. The original Senate bill included such a proviso. See S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
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In light of this preservation of employee rights, the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) has determined that
section 8(f) is not designed to substitute prehire agreements for
those provisions of the Act pertaining to the recognition of a union
as the exclusive bargaining representative for a group of workers.'
Thus, the NLRB has ruled that a union commits an unfair labor
practice when it pickets an employer to secure enforcement of the
prehire agreement because, in effect, it is seeking to gain recogni-
tion without demonstrating its majority status pursuant to the
Act." In upholding this determination, the Supreme Court broadly
(1958); S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2318, 2344.
7 See R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694 (1971), enforcement denied, 480
F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384, 1385-86 (1963).
Section 9 of the Act provides the administrative machinery for the certification of an exclu-
sive bargaining representative. R. GORMAN, supra note 5, at 40; see 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1976).
Essentially, this statutory procedure provides that after the filing of a petition supported by
a showing of interest, the NLRB will conduct an election and certify the results. Id. These
formal processes need not always be used, however, because in many instances, an employer
voluntarily recognizes the union. R. GORMAN, supra note 5, at 40. Voluntary recognition may
subject an employer to unfair labor practice charges under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2) of
the Act, if the union is not supported by a majority of the employees. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) & (2) (1976). Section 8(f) expressly provides, however, that prehire agreements will
not lead to unfair labor practice charges under section 8(a). 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
8 NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 341 (1978), af'g 216
N.L.R.B. 45 (1975); see R. GORMAN, supra note 5, at 648. Originally, the NLRB took the
position that prehire agreements could be challenged only through the Act's decertification
provisions, regardless of whether the union demonstrated majority support. See, e.g.,
Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384, 1385-87 (1963). Later, the Board expressed the
view that Congress intended section 8(f) to apply only to initial attempts at establishing a
bargaining relationship. Bricklayers & Masons Local 3, 162 N.L.R.B. 476, 478 (1966), en-
forced, 405 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1968). It was emphasized that the duties incident to a collec-
tive bargaining contract do not apply to prehire agreements. 162 N.L.R.B. at 478-79; accord,
Dallas Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 164 N.L.R.B. 938, 943 (1967), enforced, 396 F.2d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1968). The presumption that a union continues to enjoy majority support during
the term of a collective agreement was later held not to apply to contracts formed with
minority unions. See Davenport Insulation, Inc., 184 N.L.R.B. 908, 912 (1970). Finally, the
Board rejected its original position, stating that absent a union's affirmative demonstration
of majority support, an employer does not commit an unfair labor practice by repudiating a
prehire agreement and refusing to bargain with the union. See R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191
N.L.R.B. 693, 695 (1971), enforcement denied, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Board
reasoned that since Congress expressly provided for inquiry into a labor organization's ma-
jority status in the section, see generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976); note 6 and accompanying
text supra, "it would be anomalous... to hold that Section 8(f) prohibits examination of [a
union's majority] in the litigation of refusal-to-bargain charges." 191 N.L.R.B. at 694. In a
companion case, the NLRB succinctly stated its position that a "prehire agreement is
merely a preliminary step that contemplates further action for the development of a full
bargaining relationship." Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1972). One com-
mentator has suggested that these decisions demonstrate that, under the Board's view, "a
1982]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:558
stated that the employer's duty to honor a prehire agreement is
contingent upon the union's having attained majority support at a
construction site.' This statement has cast doubt upon a union's
right to enforce the provisions of prehire agreements through con-
prehire contract is, in effect, almost no contract." King & LaVaute, Current Trends in Con-
struction Industry Labor Relations-The Double-Breasted Contractor and the Prehire
Contract, 29 SYRAcusE L. Rv. 901, 934 (1978).
9 NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345 (1978). In Local
103, the Higdon Construction Company entered into a prehire agreement which purported
to bind Higdon to the terms of a multi-employer understanding between Local 103 and an
employers' association. Id. at 339. An alter ego corporation, Higdon Contracting Company,
was created to allow the employer to undertake work using nonunion labor. Id. The union
picketed two of these nonunion projects, asserting that Higdon violated the agreement. Id.
Local 103 had never represented a majority of the employees at either jobsite, nor had it
filed a petition for a representation election. Id. Higdon filed a charge with the NLRB,
alleging that Local 103 violated section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act, which makes it an unfair labor
practice for an uncertified union to picket for recognitional purposes for more than 30 days.
434 U.S. at 339; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976). The NLRB found that because picketing
to enforce a prehire agreement is the "legal equivalent of picketing to require recognition as
[an] exclusive [bargaining] agent," section 8(b)(7)(C) had been violated by the union. 434
U.S. at 346. The Supreme Court accepted this view of the Board, and further noted that the
purpose of the 1959 amendments to the Act, including sections 8(f) and 8(b)(7), was to
prevent unions from using "economic weapons to force recognition from an employer re-
gardless of the wishes of his employees." 434 U.S. at 346-47 (quoting Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975)). Reasoning that Congress was particu-
larly concerned with the use of picketing as a method of coercion, 434 U.S. at 347-49 & nn.9
& 10, the Court concluded that picketing to enforce prehire agreements is not exempted
from the operation of section 8(b)(7). Id. at 349. Moreover, the Court stated that section 8(f)
does not "expand the duty of an employer under § 8(a)(5), which is to bargain with a major-
ity representative . . . ." 434 U.S. at 346. The Court noted:
[A] prehire agreement does not entitle a minority union to be treated as the ma-
jority representative of the employees until and unless it attains majority support
in the relevant unit. Until that time the prehire agreement is voidable and does
not have the same stature as a collective-bargaining contract entered into with a
union actually representing a majority of the employees and recognized as such by
the employer.
Id. at 341. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ......
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). The duty to bargain, however, presupposes either the majority
status of the union or the existence of a collective bargaining agreement. See R. GORMAN,
supra note 5, at 399-401. Since prehire agreements do not fulfill either of these conditions,
the employer does not violate the Act by repudiating such a contract. See 434 U.S. at 345-
46. Notably, however, several courts have held that when an employer attains majority sup-
port during the term of a prehire agreement, the contract becomes a collective bargaining
agreement which may not be repudiated unilaterally notwithstanding a lack of certification.
E.g., Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Sac
Constr. Co., 603 F.2d 1155, 1157 n.9 (5th Cir. 1979). The NLRB has yet to address this
specific issue, but there are indications that it may agree with the courts. See Amado Elec.,
Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 37, 39 (1978) (prehire agreement matured into full bargaining agreement
after employer had used union hiring hall for 9 months).
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tract actions without first showing that majority support exists.10
Recently, however, in Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Engi-
neers Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co.,1 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the fringe benefit
provisions of a prehire agreement are enforceable in contract not-
withstanding the labor organization's failure to demonstrate major-
ity support among the employer's workers. 2
In Associated Wrecking, Omaha-Council Bluffs Local No.
1140 (the union) and Associated Wrecking & Salvage Company
(the employer) entered into a "participation agreement."1 " In this
contract, stipulated by the parties to be a prehire agreement, the
employer agreed to abide by the provisions of several collective
bargaining contracts between the union and various contractors'
associations in the area.14 The agreement incorporated by reference
the trust fund provisions of the collective bargaining contracts,
thus obligating the employer to make health and welfare, pension,
and holiday fund contributions to various trusts. 5 Shortly after ex-
ecuting the agreement, the employer became delinquent in its pay-
ments to the several trust funds.' 6 Thereafter, one of the trusts
and the union commenced an action seeking specific enforcement
of the participation agreement and recovery of monies due there-
under.17 The employer interposed a motion for summary judgment,
10 See, e.g., Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. E.C. Schafer Constr. Co.,
108 L.R.R.M. 2634, 2639 (5th Cir. 1981); Vermeer v. Aloha Contractors, Inc., 107 L.R.R.M.
2895, 2897 (D. Or. 1980); Paddack v. Clark, 107 L.R.R.M. 2325, 2327 (D. Or. 1980). But see
New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co., 107 L.R.R.M. 2931, 2933 (10th Cir.
1981); Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26
Wash. App. 224, 612 P.2d 436, 441 (1980). See also Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642
F.2d 1144, 1147 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ninth Circuit has not yet had occasion to decide
whether Local 103 opinion precludes enforceability).
2 638 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1981).
12 Id. at 1134.
13 Id. at 1129.
1 Id. The participation agreement was a standard form contract drafted by the union
and contained a provision imposing upon the employer an obligation to pay pension fund
contributions as specified in certain collective bargaining agreements. Id. The employer also
was bound to abide by any amendments to the collective bargaining contracts which related
to the trust fund contributions. Id. The participation agreement did not limit itself to any
particular projects and did not contain a termination date. Id.
15 Id. The trusts were reorganized pursuant to section 302 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1976). 638 F.2d at 1129 n.2. Contributions to the
trust funds were made by factoring the numbers of hours worked by all of the employer's
workers. See id. at 1129.
16 See 638 F.2d at 1130.
17 Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated
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asserting that neither the union nor the trust could enforce the
agreement without first showing that the labor organization had
acquired majority support among the employees.18 Agreeing that a
prehire agreement is wholly unenforceable until such time as the
union achieves majority status in the bargaining unit, and having
determined as a matter of law that the union had never attained
such status, the district court granted the employer's motion and
dismissed the action.19
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed, holding that prehire agreements are enforceable in con-
tract, even if the union has not demonstrated majority support.20
Judge Bright, writing for a unanimous panel, 1 initially noted that
the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Local Union No. 103,
International Association of Bridge Workers2 2 was not dispositive
of the issue, as the district court erroneously had concluded.2 3 Al-
though Judge Bright conceded that the Local 103 decision con-
tained broad language to the effect that prehire agreements are
voidable until a union attains majority support,2' he noted that
these statements "must be read in light of the specific issue before
the Court. '25 The Associated Wrecking court emphasized that Lo-
cal 103 merely determined that picketing to enforce a prehire
agreement was susceptible to unfair labor practice proceedings
under section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act because such conduct essen-
tially is recognitional picketing.2 Judge Bright observed that the
Wrecking Co., 484 F. Supp. 582, 583 (D. Neb. 1980), rev'd, 638 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1981).
18 484 F. Supp. at 583. The employer alternatively moved to compel answers to inter-
rogatories. Id.
19 Id. at 587. The district court relied upon the Supreme Court's Local 103 opinion for
the proposition that prehire agreements are "noneffective" unless the union achieves major-
ity status in the bargaining unit. Id. at 584-85, 587; see NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l As'n of
Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1978); note 9 supra. In determining that the union in
Associated Wrecking did not have such support, the Court relied on the uncontroverted
affidavit of the employer's president indicating that "at no time have a majority of [the]
employees elected or chosen the plaintiff union to act as their collective bargaining repre-
sentative." 484 F. Supp. at 587.
20 638 F.2d at 1134. The Eighth Circuit remanded for consideration questions regarding
"the interpretation, application, or duration of the parties' agreement. . . ." Id.
2 The Associated Wrecking panel consisted of Senior Judge Gibson and Judges
Heaney and Bright.
22 434 U.S. 335 (1978); see note 9 and accompanying text supra.
21 638 F.2d at 1132.
24 Id.; see 434 U.S. at 341; note 9 supra.
25 638 F.2d at 1132.
26 Id. at 1133. The Associated Wrecking court reasoned that since the Local 103 Court
looked to the NLRB's "view of the relationship between sections 8(f) and 8(b)(7)(C)," the
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Supreme Court's opinion was designed to further the congressional
policy of protecting employees' freedom to select a bargaining rep-
resentative.27 Distinguishing the impermissible situation in Local
103, where the union indirectly sought to obtain majority status for
its own benefit, the court concluded that the present litigation
would not implicate the countervailing policy concern of preserving
employee freedom since the union sought only to enforce benefits
inuring directly to individual employees.28 Moreover, the Associ-
ated Wrecking panel emphasized that although an employer may
challenge a union's majority status as a defense to unfair labor
practice allegations, such a contention should not defeat an action
sounding in contract.29 Therefore, having determined that the Lo-
cal 103 decision was of no precedential value in the instant case,
the court focused upon the equities involved in deciding whether
prehire agreements are enforceable.
Noting that a prehire agreement is negotiated reciprocally on
behalf of the union and the employer, Judge Bright stressed that
the employer's acceptance of the benefits thereunder created a
contractual obligation to abide by the terms of the agreement.30
Furthermore, the court considered the union's recognized interest
in maintaining standards of employment a sufficient predicate, re-
gardless of majority status, to preclude the imposition of a per se
bar to an action for the breach of a section 8(f) agreement.31 Thus,
Judge Bright concluded, the absence of majority status is without
legal significance in determining the enforceability of a prehire
agreement under contract principles.2
The Associated Wrecking decision brings the Eighth Circuit
into conflict with various courts which have considered the con-
Supreme Court "did not purport to decide the enforceability of all section 8(f) agreements
but only those which implicated the provisions of section 8(b)(7)(C)." 638 F.2d at 1133.
27 638 F.2d at 1133.
28 Id. at 1133-34. The court noted that the payments to the trust funds would "inure to
the benefit of the individual employees" whether or not the union attained majority status.
Id. at 1133.
29 Id.
20 Id. at 1134. The court stated that "the benefits of a prehire agreement do not travel
down a one-way street." Id. Noting that employers obtain the advantages of realizing their
labor costs in advance of project bidding, and of having access to a pool of workers, the
court stated that the corresponding obligations under a prehire agreement must be honored.
Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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tractual enforceability of prehire agreements. 3 This conflict arises
from varying judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court's Local
103 opinion, in which the enforceability of such contracts purport-
edly had been denied. 4 It is suggested that the Eighth Circuit jus-
tifiably recognized that the Local 103 decision bears little prece-
dential value in contexts not implicating representation questions
and the unfair labor practices which may flow therefrom. Indeed, it
seems that the split of authority in this area has resulted from a
failure to draw a distinction between the contractual and represen-
tational aspects of prehire agreements.3
The National Labor Relations Act contains a substantial num-
ber of provisions prescribing the rights and liabilities of employers
and unions with respect to bargaining and representation ques-
tions.36 Section 9(a) of the Act, for example, provides that a union
may become the exclusive representative of all employees within a
bargaining unit when a majority thereof designate the union as
such.3 7 Once a labor organization is so designated, the employer is
33 See, e.g., Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. E.C. Schafer Constr. Co.,
108 L.R.R.M. 2634, 2639-40 (5th Cir. 1981); Vermeer v. Aloha Contractors, Inc., 107
L.R.R.M. 2895, 2897 (D. Or. 1980); Paddack v. Clark, 107 L.R.R.M. 2325, 2327 (D. Or.
1980). A number of courts are in accord with the Associated Wrecking panel's view. See,
e.g., New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Constr. Co., 107 L.R.R.M. 2931,
2931-32 (10th Cir. 1981); Eastern Dist. Council of the United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners
v. Blake Constr. Co., 457 F. Supp. 825, 829 (E.D. Va. 1978); Western Wash. Cement Masons
Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 24, 612 P.2d 436, 441
(1980).
See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
11 See generally Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. E.C. Schafer Constr.
Co., 108 L.R.R.M. 2634 (5th Cir. 1981). In Baton Rouge, the Fifth Circuit noted that the
Associated Wrecking court distinguished Local 103 as involving unfair labor practice
charges rather than a breach of contract. Id. at 2639. Although the Fifth Circuit perceived
this distinction, it declined to follow the approach of the Eighth Circuit in Associated
Wrecking, stating:
We acknowledge that neither [Local 103 nor a previous Fifth Circuit case]
directly dealt with the question of the nonenforceability of a prehire agreement as
a defense to a breach of contract suit; these cases are not, therefore, squarely in
point. But this distinction makes no difference. If the goal is the maintenance and
insurance of employee free choice, it matters not whether the sword dangling
above the employer's head is an unfair labor practice charge or a breach of con-
tract suit. The direction of the pressure is the same-toward treatment of a non-
majority union as the employee's agent for collective bargaining.
Id. at 2639.
:e See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
7 Section 9(a) of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
1982] PREHIRE AGREEMENTS
statutorily obligated to bargain with that union," and breach of
this duty constitutes an unfair labor practice.3 9
Unfair labor practices principally involve attempts to evade or
breach these statutory provisions relating to the employees' repre-
sentational rights.4 0 The effect of an unfair labor practice upon the
enforceability of a contract can be seen in the Supreme Court's
opinion in International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v.
NLRB.41 In Garment Workers, the employer and the union were
accused of unfair labor practices because an agreement was formed
which recognized the union as an exclusive bargaining representa-
tive before a majority of the employer's workers designated the
union as such.42 The Supreme Court affirmed the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit's enforcement of the NLRB's order, which required
that the agreement be given no effect.4 3 The Court observed that
the Act's guarantee of free choice in the selection of a bargaining
representative does not permit a minority of employees to "im-
press [a union] upon the nonconsenting majority." Thus, the
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). For a brief description of the means by which employees desig-
nate a union as its exclusive representative, see note 7 supra.
3' See, e.g., NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 449 F.2d 1333, 1335 (5th Cir. 1971); 29
U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
39 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides that it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representa-
tives of his employees." Id. Through its definition of collective bargaining, the Act mandates
that an employer bargain "in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment" and execute "a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if [so] requested." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). The duty to bargain in good faith
imposes upon the employer an obligation to refrain from making unilateral changes in an
agreement. R. GORMAN, supra note 5, at 419, 439-43. If a contract is modified or terminated,
there are requirements that both the union and governmental mediation agencies be noti-
fied. Id. at 419; see 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1)-(3) (1976). It is clear, therefore, that apart from
unusual contractual obligations, an agreement which implicates employees' rights to repre-
sentation carries with it significant bargaining obligations. Notwithstanding the existence of
bargaining obligations, however, the Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he Act does not com-
pel any agreement whatsoever between employees and employers." See NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952) (citation omitted). The intent of the Act is to en-
courage the formation of voluntary agreements by requiring unions and employers to bar-
gain in good faith. Id.; see Newspaper Guild Local 10 v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 550, 561 n.35 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Glomac Plastics, Inc. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 94, 97-98 (2d Cir. 1979); Continental
Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 44, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1974).
'o See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(5), (b)(1)-(7) (1976).
41 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
42 Id. at 732-33.
43 Id. at 740.
" Id. at 737.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:558
Court noted, a contract which purports to grant exclusive recogni-
tion, absent majority status, abridges the representational rights of
employees and is unenforceable because of its "unlawful genesis. '
Notably, the Supreme Court in Local 103 described section
8(f) as creating an exception to the rule enunciated in Garment
Workers.48 The Court hastened to add, however, that the exception
was a limited one, for although the mere formation of a prehire
agreement cannot be considered an unfair labor practice under
Garment Workers,47 it can neither expand the employer's duty to
bargain nor bind employees to a particular representative. 8 Hence,
the Court held that a mere prehire agreement cannot serve to dis-
sipate the illegality of recognitional picketing, a practice deemed
"to interfere with. . . employees' freedom of choice" in selecting a
bargaining representative. 49 Thus, it seems clear that the Local 103
Court was concerned solely with the bargaining and representa-
tional obligations associated with prehire agreements.50 Although
the Court noted that such agreements are "voidable," this state-
ment was not made in the context of contractual enforceability.
Rather, the Court addressed only the question of whether prehire
agreements can be used to defend against unfair labor practice
charges implicating representational rights. 1
45 Id. Writing for the Court, Justice Clark noted that the unfair labor practice involved
"was the grant by the employer of exclusive representative status to a minority union, as
distinguished from an employer's bargaining with a minority union for its members only."
Id. at 736. Refusing to hold the contract enforceable as against those employees who acqui-
esced in the agreement, Justice Clark stated that the element of illegality "preclude[d even]
its partial validity." Id. at 737. Justices Black and Douglas dissented in part, asserting that
the majority was unjustified in holding that the entire contract was invalid. Id. at 743
(Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting in part). Reasoning that minority unions always had been
able to represent their own members, the dissenting justices noted that the Court's holding
went "beyond the competency of the Board under the Act and [was] unsupported by any
principle of contract law." Id. at 743-44 (Douglas & Black, JJ., dissenting in part).
41 NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 345 (1978).
7 See id.
48 See id. The Local 103 Court noted that the section 8(f) exception to the Garment
Workers doctrine was "of limited scope, for the usual rule protecting the union from inquiry
into its majority status during the terms of a collective-bargaining contract does not apply
to prehire agreements." Id.
4. Id. at 347, 352.
60 See id. at 341.
51 The Local 103 Court noted that the issue in the case was whether the NLRB misap-
plied section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act. 434 U.S. at 341. Indeed, the Court stated that the Board
and the D.C. Circuit "differ[ed] principally on the legal question of how § 8(f) is to be
construed and of what consequences the execution of a prehire agreement has on the en-
forcement of other sections of the Act, primarily §§ 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(7)(C)." 434 U.S. at 341.
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Moreover, it is significant that the Local 103 majority did not
wholeheartedly endorse the NLRB's interpretation of section 8(f),
but adopted its view as "a defensible construction."52 Because the
NLRB is charged with the responsibility of effectuating federal la-
bor policy in the areas of bargaining and representation, its views
are given considerable deference by the courts in unfair labor prac-
tice cases. 53 Since the Board has the power "to prevent any person
from engaging in an unfair labor practice, '"" it may become in-
volved when a contractual obligation implicates bargaining or rep-
resentation issues.55 Nevertheless, the NLRB "has no general com-
mission to police" labor contracts and "strike down contractual
provisions in which there is no element of an unfair labor prac-
tice. '58 It therefore would seem anomalous to remove the Local 103
It is suggested, therefore, that the Court's decision should be read to affect contractual obli-
gations only to the extent that it imposes a condition precedent of majority status to the
employer's duty to recognize the union as the employees' bargaining representative.
52 The Local 103 Court noted that the Board's resolution of the alleged conflict be-
tween sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(7) and 8(f) "represent[ed] a defensible construction" of the Act,
which was entitled to deference since unfair labor practices were involved, 434 U.S. at 350,
but stated that the NLRB's interpretation of section 8(f) was "not the only tenable one." Id.
at 341.
53 E.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965); NLRB v. National
Ass'n of Broadcast Employees & Technicians Local 31, 631 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
In construing the Act, the Board must not stretch the statute's provisions "far beyond their
functions of protecting the rights of employee organizations and collective bargaining."
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. at 317; accord, NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477, 497-98 (1960).
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
11 See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 184, 188 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1979); Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 59 v. Employees Ass'n of Roofers & Sheet Metal Workers,
Inc., 430 F. Supp. 540, 544 (D. Del. 1977); Brewery Delivery Employees Local 46, 236
N.L.R.B. 1160, 1160 (1978); Supreme Equip. & Sys. Corp., 235 N.L.R.B. 244, 251-52 (1978).
When contract rights and liabilities are adjudicated, the Board's views are entitled to defer-
ence if unfair labor practices also are involved. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of
Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978); Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859, 886
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2058 (1981); Marriott Corp. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 367,
370 (9th Cir. 1974).
" Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 108 (1958).
While the courts must fashion from the policy of federal labor laws a substantive law to
apply in contract actions under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976);
e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957); see, e.g., Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 470 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Blaw-Knox Foundry
& Mill Mach., Inc. 319 F. Supp. 636, 640 (W.D. Pa. 1970), there is no requirement that they
accept the NLRB's construction of a statute in traditional contract litigation. 357 U.S. at
101-02; NLRB v. Heyman, 541 F.2d 796, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1976); see United Constr. Workers
v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 657 (1954); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. East
Bay Union of Machinists Local 1304, 344 F.2d 300, 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826
(1965). It has been stated that recovery in a contract action is predicated upon the existence
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opinion from its context of unfair labor practices and concomitant
deference to the NLRB, only to place it in the context of bare con-
tractual obligations in which the Board's view is immaterial. Thus,
it is suggested that the Eighth Circuit in Associated Wrecking
properly refused to extend Local 103 to deny enforcement of a
prehire agreement in a case which did not implicate unfair labor
practices.
Since reference to Local 103 will not dispose of the question
regarding the enforceability of prehire contracts, it is necessary to
examine the policies behind the enactment of section 8(f). It ap-
pears that the legislative history accompanying section 8(f), as well
as the congressional purpose in enacting the provision, support the
Associated Wrecking court's view that prehire agreements are en-
forceable. Enacted primarily in response to the NLRB's determi-
nation that the Act applies to the construction industry,57 section
8(f) was designed to account for the unique, transitory employ-
ment relationships which typify construction work.5 8 Congress real-
of an agreement and its concomitant obligations, which are issues not properly before the
NLRB absent unfair labor practice implications. See 541 F.2d at 800; 344 F.2d at 304. More-
over, since Congress intended bargaining orders of the Board to "be in addition to, and not
in lieu of, other remedies," H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 52, reprinted in [1947]
U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. Nzws 1135, 1158, it has been held that contract violations are to be
determined by the "usual processes of the law," independent of administrative decisions,
Charles Dowd Box. Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962). Finally, it is significant that
the Supreme Court has noted previously that since NLRB decisions deal with unfair labor
practices, not ordinarily implicated by contract breaches, a union's inability to invoke a
valid agreement to defend against charges made by the Board does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that contractual relations do not exist between the parties. See Local 1976,
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. at 108.
'7 See II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 5, at 1577-78. Originally, the NLRB declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the construction industry. NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d 1265, 1267 (3d Cir.
1973). As a result, the development of national labor policy matured without reference to
the complexities inherent in the construction industry. S. REP. No. 187, supra note 6; H.R.
REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DIsCLOsuRE AcT OF 1959, at 777 [hereinafter cited
as I LEGIS. HIST.]. After the Taft-Hartley amendments were passed, however, the Board
reversed its prior view and applied the provisions of the Act to the building and construc-
tion industry. Id.; NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d at 1267. Thus, a labor policy formulated for a
stable work force was thrust upon an industry characterized by intermittent employment
relationships. II LEGIS. HIST., supra note 5, at 1577-78; see Local No. 150, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Because the Act has incor-
porated the principles of majority rule concerning the selection of a bargaining representa-
tive, which are based upon the premise of long term continuous employment relationships,
the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements in the construction industry was imprac-
ticable. II LEGis. HIST., supra note 5, at 1577-78.
" NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 347-49 (1978); R.J.
Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694 (1971), enforcement denied, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C.
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ized that the short duration of construction projects severely im-
peded the NLRB's ability to conduct representation elections in
this industry.5 9 Moreover, the legislature recognized that in order
to assess labor costs and to ensure that a ready supply of skilled
craftsmen will be available, the construction employer normally
hires a union before hiring an individual.60 Therefore, notwith-
standing the typical application of the Act in an industrial context,
Congress responded to the realities of the construction industry by
legitimizing prehire agreements between unions and construction
employers." In manifest disregard of the general proscriptions
against agreements with minority unions embodied in sections
8(a)(1), 8(a)(2) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act,62 Congress conceded that
it was necessary to permit construction "employers to enter into
collective bargaining agreements for [projects] which had not been
started," even if such work had not yet been contemplated.63
Cir. 1973).
59 Witney, supra note 4, at 646; see I LEGIS. MHST., supra note 57, at 777; H LEGIS.
IsT., supra note 5, at 1578.
So E.g. Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1189 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); H LEGIS. HIST., supra note 5, at 1577. Congress realized that it had been "cus-
tomary for [construction] employers to enter into collective bargaining agreements for peri-
ods of time running into the future, perhaps 1 year or in many instances as much as 3
years." S. REP. No. 187, supra note 6. Moreover, the legislature recognized that the "rela-
tively short duration" of the "vast majority of building projects," I LIaS. HST., supra note
57, at 777, made it manifestly inefficient to bargain a new contract at each construction site,
11 LEGIS. HsT., supra note 5, at 1578.
" See notes 1-6 and accompanying text supra.
62 See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
3 S. REP. No. 187, supra note 5, at 29. Congress exempted the construction industry
from the ambit of section 8(e) of the Act also in deference to the nature of employment
relationships in the industry. 105 CONG. REC. 17899 (1959) (remarks of Sen. J. Kennedy); id.
at 18134 (remarks of Rep. Thompson). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976); H LEGIS.
HIsT., supra note 5, at 1791. Section 8(e) was enacted as "part of a legislative program
designed to plug technical loopholes in § 8(b)(4)'s general prohibition of secondary" boy-
cotts. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 628 (1975).
Section 8(b)(4) provides that a labor organization may not strike, engage in certain con-
certed activity, or induce employees to do the same in order to compel an employer to re-
frain from transacting business with someone having a dispute with the union. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). Section 8(b)(4), however, did not outlaw voluntary agreements
of this nature. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98-99
(1958). The enactment of section 8(e) proscribed such "hot cargo" provisions, as well as
union coercion designed to force an employer to accept them. R. GoRmIA, supra note 5, at
263. Section 8(e) provides, however, that its proscription against hot cargo agreements shall
not "apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construc-
tion industry." See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). One court, reasoning sub silentio that Con-
gress intended similar treatment to be accorded to sections 8(e) and 8(f), concluded that
prehire agreements should be judicially enforceable. Western Wash. Cement Masons Health
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It is suggested that to deny the enforceability of prehire agree-
ments would render meaningless Congress' concession to the reali-
ties of the construction industry." Nothing in the text or legisla-
tive history of section 8(f) indicates that Congress intended to
benefit construction employers to such a degree that they would be
able to reap the benefits of a ready workforce while remaining free
to repudiate prehire agreements at will, incurring no corresponding
obligation. e On the contrary, section 8(f) seems to have been
designed to allow the formation of binding contracts which differ
from usual collective bargaining agreements only if they do not
constitute a contract bar to a representation election."6 Moreover,
it is suggested that this proviso concerning the contract bar was
& Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 224, 612 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1980).
The employer who raises a union's lack of majority status to defeat the enforcement
of a prehire agreement today may find that the same defense will be used against him to-
morrow. Indeed, 4 months after the Associated Wrecking case was decided, the Eighth Cir-
cuit, in W.C. James, Inc. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, 646 F.2d 1292 (8th
Cir. 1981), affirmed a summary judgment against an employer suing for breach of a prehire
agreement. Id. at 1296. In James, the union repudiated its prehire agreement with the em-
ployer and raised its own lack of majority status as a defense in the resulting breach of
contract action. Id. at 1293-94. Noting that the employer sought prospective enforcement of
the agreement, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Associated Wrecking as involving only ret-
rospective enforceability. Id. at 1295 n.4. The James court then looked to the Local 103
case, stating that "[w]e are persuaded that [its] holding controls the outcome of this case."
Id. at 1295.
Notably, Judge Bright, who authored the opinion in Associated Wrecking, concurred in
the judgment of the James court, but on an alternative ground. Id. at 1296 (Bright, J.,
concurring). Judge Bright disagreed with the majority's holding regarding the enforceability
of prehire agreements, noting that Local 103 "does not control the outcome of this case, as
the present controversy arises in the context of an alleged breach of contract, not in the
context of an unfair labor practice." Id. (Bright, J., concurring); see notes 46-56 and accom-
panying text supra.
It seems that the James case illustrates that the Local 103 defense is a double-edged
sword. More importantly, however, the case demonstrates that the nonenforceabiity of
prehire agreements frustrates congressional objectives. Indeed, given that Congress enacted
section 8(f) to permit employers to obtain workers and to gauge costs, see notes 57-63 and
accompanying text supra, it seems that a union's ability to dishonor prehire contracts ne-
gates an employer's capacity to undertake projects while retaining the sense of certainty
that Congress intended to confer.
'5 See, e.g., Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1189-90
(D.C. Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d 1265, 1271 (3d Cir. 1973). But see NLRB v. AAA
Elec., Inc., 472 F.2d 444, 448-49 (6th Cir. 1973).
" See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
In Connell, the Supreme Court considered the legislative history of section 8(f), concluding
that the availability of a representation election was a "careful [safeguard] preserving work-
ers' rights to decline union representation." Id. at 632 (dicta). This statement markedly
contrasts the language in Local 103. See Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S.
335, 343-44 (1978).
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intended not to cast doubt upon the enforceability of prehire
agreements, but to provide employees with a method to rescind a
union's purported majority support or to attain protected bargain-
ing status when the construction project is to be of extended dura-
tion. 6 7 Although employers also are permitted to petition for a cer-
tification or decertification election under this section,"8 no
mention is made in the legislative history of an employer's absolute
right to terminate prehire agreements. 69 Since section 8(f) permits
a test of support through a petition for an election, therefore, it is
submitted that employers should not be given the option of termi-
nating the agreement and litigating the question of majority status
in a breach of contract action.
CONCLUSION
The differifig views concerning the contractual enforceability
of prehire agreements demonstrate a need to separate the related,
but distinct, questions of representational rights and contractual
obligations. Reference to the substantial body of law arising out of
the adjudication of unfair labor practices may be required in some
cases involving contract rights and liabilities. Nevertheless, it is
submitted that in contract cases not implicating questions of bar-
gaining or representation, reference to unfair labor practice princi-
ples is inappropriate. This appears to have been the underlying
premise of the Associated Wrecking decision. It is hoped that
other courts will follow this analytical approach when faced with
the issue of the enforceability of prehire agreements.
John F. Finnegan
67 See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(f), 159(c)(1)(B) (1976).
e See generally Hearings on S. 1973 Before the Subcomm. on Labor and Labor-Man-
agement Relations of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
pts. 1-6 (1953-1954); S. REP. No. 1211, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954); S. REP. No. 1509, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1952).
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